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This survey of recent research in corporate finance discusses how business taxes, subsidies 
as well as a country's institutional development affect several important decision margins of 
heterogeneous firms. We argue that innovative firms, as a result of agency problems 
between insiders and outside investors, are most frequently finance constrained. We discuss 
how profit taxes reduce investment of constrained firms by their effect on cash-flow, and of 
unconstrained firms by their effect on the user cost of capital. Moreover, tax reform as well 
as tax financed R&D subsidies can enhance aggregate investment, innovation and efficiency by 
implicitly redistributing profits towards constrained firms where capital earns the highest 
return. We argue that the corporate legal form improves firms' access to external funds. We 
then explain the firms' choice between venture capital and bank financing and discuss how 
business taxation can affect venture capital financing on both the extensive and intensive 
margins. Finally, we review theory and evidence on how corporate finance may shape a 
country's comparative advantage in innovative industries as well as aggregate labor market 
performance when part of firms are finance constrained. 
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 The  last  decades  have  seen  an  unprecedented  integration  of  domestic  capital 
markets  and  a  major  increase  in  possible  financing  sources  for  private  companies. 
Nevertheless, in many countries, a substantial share of firms still experiences difficulties in 
obtaining adequate funding for  their investment projects.  These frictions are often traced 
back  to  agency  problems  within  firms.  Outside  investors  typically  find  it  difficult  or  even 
impossible to observe and control the behavior of managers or entrepreneurs and, for this 
reason,  will  hesitate  to  supply  external  funds.  Incentive  contracts  can  help  to  align  the 
different parties' interests more closely but often do not succeed to fully eliminate agency 
problems. Borrowing remains restricted  in financially dependent sectors  so that firms are 
unable to fully exploit their investment opportunities. The traditional, neoclassical literature on 
business taxation abstracts from agency problems or models them only in reduced form (see 
Hassett and Hubbard, 2002; Auerbach, 2002; and Graham, 2003). Firms optimally invest 
until the return on investment is equal to the user cost of capital. Including agency problems 
and  financing  constraints  introduces  new  determinants  of  investment  absent  from  the 
neoclassical model, and changes the transmission channels for tax policy. 
This  chapter  aims  at  giving  an  overview  of  how  different  company  decisions  are 
affected  by  various  tax  policy  instruments  when  at  least  part  of  the  firms  are  finance 
constrained due to agency problems between inside and outside investors. To organize the 
discussion, we present a simple theoretical model of constrained and unconstrained firms 
with endogenous organizational choice in Section 2. The model is based on Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1997) and Tirole (2006) and includes financing constraints due to moral hazard. When 
the managerial effort of entrepreneurs is not observable, a high success probability of the 
firm  is  guaranteed  only  if  insiders  keep  a  large  enough  financial  stake  in  the  firm. 
Accordingly,  the  company's  income  pledgeable  as  a  repayment  to  external  investors  is 
reduced and limits the amount of external funding that the firm can obtain. This framework of 
financially constrained firms leads to predictions for the effects of taxes on investment and 
external financing that are entirely different from the traditional neoclassical model (Section 
3). The firms that are most  likely to be finance constrained are small, innovative growth companies with relatively few own assets and large investment opportunities. Section 4 thus 
focuses on the implications of R&D subsidies as a prominent policy instrument to stimulate 
innovation and productivity when innovative firms have difficulty in fully exploiting investment 
opportunities  due  to  financial  constraints.  Section  5  highlights  the  role  of  active 
intermediaries such venture capital in funding innovative firms: venture capitalists not only 
provide funds, but also add value by advising and monitoring the firm. Since this activity is 
costly, venture capital is more expensive than standard bank financing. Depending on the 
cost of venture capital financing relative to its productivity, it may be useful to different types 
of firms for different reasons, either because it raises a firm's external financing capacity or 
because it adds value. The impact of taxes is also dependent on these cases. 
Section 6 argues that the effects of taxes depend on other institutional characteristics. 
We  suggest  that  the  quality  of  commercial  law  and  accounting  standards  explains  the 
advantages of the corporate legal form compared to sole proprietorships. Incorporation is 
valuable because it raises a firm's access to external capital, and these benefits are larger 
when accounting and reporting standards are tough. Taxes affect incorporation and the level 
of externally financed investment of corporate firms, and more so in countries with a good 
legal environment. Section 7 turns to firms' payout policy and the effects of dividend taxation. 
Section 8 discusses the new firm based literature in international economics and shows how 
financing  frictions  can  endogenously  determine  a  country's  comparative  advantage  in 
innovative industries because innovative firms with large investment opportunities are the 
most likely to be finance constrained. Section 9 briefly touches on labor market issues of 
corporate  finance.  In  the  next  section,  we  first  review  important  empirical  regularities  on 
agency problems and the prevalence of financing constraints. 
 
1. AGENCY PROBLEMS AND FINANCING CONSTRAINTS 
The importance of financing constraints  has been studied extensively in the empirical 
literature. This research has yielded several regularities in firm and country characteristics 
that  make  financing  frictions  more  probable.  We  focus  here  on  three  aspects:  First,  the quality of legal investor protection and the degree of financial market development; secondly, 
the  size  of  firms  as  measured  by  their  internal  assets;  and  thirdly,  the  degree  of 
innovativeness as an indicator of investment opportunities. 
The availability of external funds rests on the willingness of banks and other financial 
intermediaries  to  invest  in  a  business  project.  These  incentives  depend  on  the  effective 
return they can expect in terms of future repayments and, in particular, the amount of funds 
they can retrieve in case of business failure. The effective return on external funds not only 
depends on specific firm characteristics but also on the legal environment that determines to 
which  degree  these  claims  will  effectively  be  honored.  The  key  argument  is  that  a  well 
developed institutional environment with tight investor and creditor protection, tough reporting 
and  accounting  standards  and  other  governance  rules  narrows  down  the  degree  of 
managerial autonomy. Corporate insiders find it more difficult to misuse funds or to divert 
managerial effort to unproductive activities ('private benefits') so that outside investors will 
become more certain about repayment and more willing to supply funds. La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and the subsequent law and finance literature compiled 
several measures that summarize the quality of investor protection across countries: anti-
director rights mainly capture the influence of outside shareholders in corporate decision 
processes while creditor  rights reflect the  ability  to seize loan collateral in the case of a 
reorganization or bankruptcy. The effectiveness of legal rights is enhanced by the quality of 
law enforcement. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 2000b) show that 
countries which perform poorly along these measures, have less developed capital markets 
and firms in institutionally less developed countries experience greater difficulties in obtaining 
external  finance  (see  Graff,  2008,  and  Spamann,  2008,  for  a  critical  review  on  the 
compilation of these indices). 
Rajan  and  Zingales  (1998)  provide  evidence  that  financing  constraints  are  more 
prevalent in countries  with poorly developed financial markets and that  these  restrictions 
impair the growth of companies that are dependent on external finance. However, it is not 
only the development of existing companies that is negatively affected. They also show that the number of new firms created in financially dependent industries is particularly sensitive to 
the level of financial development. The level of entrepreneurship thus crucially depends on 
the financial environment. 
Even in countries with poorly developed financial systems, financing constraints are 
not  equally  tight  for  all  firms.  In  differentiating  by  firm  size,  Beck,  Demirgüc-Kunt,  and 
Maksimovic (2005) show that the smallest firms are most strongly affected. As financial and 
institutional characteristics improve, the constraints become less tight. Small firms catch up 
and benefit the most. These results are confirmed by Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Maksimovic 
(2008) who focus on the importance of alternative sources of finance for small and large 
firms. Small firms, especially in poor institutional environments, are able to raise less external 
finance, in particular bank finance. Well developed property rights boost external financing in 
small firms more strongly than in large firms, and the increase mainly results from easier 
access  to  bank  credit.  Other  sources  of  finance  are  not  able  to  compensate  for  lacking 
access to bank financing. The same finding is also emphasized by Fisman and Love (2003) 
who study trade credit as an alternative funding source when financial markets are poorly 
developed. While established firms can effectively use trade credit to compensate for the 
non-availability of bank credit, this channel is practically closed to new firms. 
The importance of firm size for financial market access is already apparent when the 
firm  is  created  (see  Aghion,  Fally,  and  Scarpetta,  2007).  Financial  development  most 
strongly raises entry rates of smaller firms whereas entry of larger firms shows no or even a 
negative response. Even in advanced economies, there is scope to promote entry of small 
firms and their subsequent growth by improving institutions. 
The reading of the empirical literature also points to firm characteristics which create 
difficulties in accessing external financing. Financing constraints are more prevalent among 
small, innovative and entrepreneurial firms. Being small, they have little own funds. Being 
innovative,  they typically have large investment opportunities and need large amounts of 
external funds compared to own assets. Finally, if the managerial and technological know-
how  is  embodied  in  a  dominating  entrepreneur,  agency  costs  are  larger  and  external investors are more hesitant to supply funds because it is more difficult to monitor the firm and 
to  evaluate  the  incentives  and  potential  of  the  entrepreneur.  By  implication,  the  firm's 
investment behavior becomes closely tied to internally available resources. In a neoclassical 
world without financing frictions, a firm would invest until the rate of return is equated to the 
user  cost  of  capital,  and  investment  would  be  independent  of  internal  resources  and 
institutional determinants of financial development. However, when investors are reluctant to 
lend capital because of severe uncertainties concerning repayment, firms use all available 
cash-flow  to  self-finance  investment.  Even  with  maximum  self-financing,  the  external 
leverage of own funds is limited and restricts investment below the efficient scale where it still 
earns an excess return. Hence, when financing constraints are binding, these firms must be 
very profitable, have unexploited investment opportunities and earn an excess return. 
The theoretical prediction of the cash-flow sensitivity of investment has been studied 
extensively in the empirical literature (for a survey, see Hubbard, 1998). Schaller (1993) and 
Chirinko  and  Schaller  (1995)  find  correlations  between  physical  capital  investment  and 
internal  funds  around  0.4  for  small  firms,  which  are  substantially  higher  than  the 
corresponding values of around 0.2 for large firms.
1 Apart from firm size, another criterion 
that differentiates constrained and unconstrained firms, is their banking relationship. When 
firms have close ties to banks, the informational asymmetry  is reduced, and they are more 
likely to obtain the required funding for their projects. Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) 
indeed report investment - cash flow sensitivities of only around 0.05 for these types of firms 
in Japan, whereas correlations for independent firms vary between 0.45-0.5. Similar numbers 
are found by Schaller (1993) and Chirinko and Schaller (1995) who separate firms according 
to their relationship to other groups of firms. Of course, spending on physical assets captures 
only part of a firm's total investments.  When all categories of investment  including working 
capital are taken into account, the sensitivity of total investment to cash flow in  constrained 
firms  typically  exceeds  1  (Fazzari  and  Petersen,  1993;  Calomiris  and  Hubbard,   1995; 
Carpenter and Petersen, 2002).  
                                                 Apart from the quality of the institutional environment and of the level of a firm's own 
assets, the nature of the investment project itself determines to a large extent whether a firm 
finds it difficult to raise sufficient external funds. Because of its novelty and potentially high 
technical sophistication,  an  innovative business idea aggravates  information problems for 
outside  investors.  Further,  the  knowledge  to  carry  out  the  project  successfully  is  often 
intrinsic which makes the entrepreneur's effort essential but, at the same time,  also very 
difficult  to  monitor.  For these  reasons,  innovative  firms  are  more  likely  to  become  credit 
rationed. In addition, since innovative firms by their very definition are highly productive, they 
have large investment opportunities and need large external funds which, again, makes it 
likely that the financing capacity is exhausted and investment becomes finance constrained. 
The empirical literature confirms that external financing of R&D activities itself, especially in 
small  firms,  is  severely  constrained  and  must,  to  a  very  large  extent,  be  self-financed 
(Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Ughetto, 2008; Hall, 2002; Hall and Lerner, 2009). The 
cost of capital that is used for R&D spending is much higher than the one associated with 
more  traditional  investment.  Furthermore,  Guiso  (1998)  and  Ughetto  (2009)  show  that 
innovative firms are in general more likely to be constrained in all their activities requiring 
external funding which makes them unable to fully exploit the investment potential created by 
their innovations. The next section proposes a model of heterogeneous firms that reflects the 
above mentioned empirical regularities. 
 
2. A SIMPLE MODEL 
The  following  sections  discuss  how  finance  constraints  can  affect  a  variety  of 
organizational decisions on top of capital investments. To guide this discussion, we present a 
unifying framework which is more fully analyzed in Keuschnigg and Ribi (2010). The model 
endogenously explains the emergence of credit constraints in small and innovative firms and, 
in particular, shows how finance constraints on subsequent expansion investment feeds back 
on the R&D decision even if R&D is fully self-financed.  Suppose there is a mass of entrepreneurs E, each running one firm. Entrepreneurs 
are endowed with own wealth A, reflecting the internal resources of the firm. We divide the 
life-cycle of a firm in an early stage where the firm can decide on a discrete R&D investment, 
and  a  subsequent  expansion  stage  where  physical  capital  is  invested.  Firms  differ  with 
respect to the success probability  ' [0,1] q  of the early stage activity, with probability 1' q   
it fails and is closed down. Given type  ' q , the firm decides whether or not to incur a fixed 
R&D cost k which must be financed out of own assets and is possibly subsidized at rate  . 
R&D  raises  factor  productivity  c   of  the  production  function  () c c c x f I   where  f(I)  is 
increasing and concave. If the firm abstains from R&D and saves the fixed cost (or chooses 
lower R&D spending normalized to zero), it will be left with low productivity  uc  and a less 
efficient production technology  () u u u x f I . 
Once a firm has successfully survived the start-up phase, it enters the expansion 
phase and chooses physical capital investment and, thus, the subsequent production scale. 
Given initial wealth, R&D spending results in residual wealth  (1 ) c A A k  while non-
innovating  firms  have  undiminished  resources  u AA .  We  assume  that  residual  inter nal 
funds Aj, j = u,c, at this stage are insufficient to cover the desired investment level Ij. Hence, 
firms must raise external funds Dj.
2 Having negotiated a credit and the  required repayment, 
the  entrepreneur  exerts   unobservable  managerial  effort.  Effort  determines  the  success 
probability of  expansion stage investment.  If  effort  is high,  investment is successful and 
output is produced with probability p while all investment is lost and no output produced with 
probability  1-p. When choosing low effort,  the survival  probability falls to  pL  <  p, but the 
entrepreneur enjoys private benefits Bj = bIj. When the entrepreneur is successful, she earn 
revenue from production sales, pays tax, repays the bank credit, and claims the residual 
profit. If the firm fails, investment is lost and earnings are zero. 
 
 
                                                 Surplus 
Given  a  success  probability  p,  resulting  from  high  managerial  effort,  the 
entrepreneur's expected surplus 
e
j  over own residual assets Aj  in the expansion stage is 
, (1 )
e e e
j j j j j j j j pv RA v I x i D T . 
The entrepreneur's compensation in the success state, 
e
j v , amounts to income from 
sales xj and disinvestment Ij, after subtracting debt repayment (principal plus interest) and the 
tax liability Tj. Given insufficient internal resources, firms must raise external funds in the 
amount of Dj=Ij-Aj. Banks charge interest iDj on risky business debt but must pay a risk-free 
interest rate r in the deposit market which is assumed fixed. The bank's expected profit is 
(1 )
b
j j j p i D RD , where R=1+r. Competition drives bank profits to zero, giving p(1+i)=R, 
which links loan and deposit rates of interest. If she is able to get the required credit, the 
entrepreneur obtains the whole private surplus of the firm, ()
eb
j j j j j j j p I x T RI  
which may also be written as  () j j j j p x iI T  by using the bank's zero profit condition.  
When external financing is unconstrained and banks are perfectly competitive, the 
first best level of investment maximizes  j and is given by  '( ) jj f I u  where u is the user 
cost of capital which depends on the specific tax system in place (see below). In the absence 
of tax, the user cost is the loan rate of interest, u=i. Investment is expanded until the return 
on capital is equal to the user cost. There is no excess return when firms are unrestricted in 
exploiting investment opportunities. Investment exclusively depends on the user cost as in 
neoclassical  theory,  but  neither  on  the  amount  internal  resources  nor  on  institutional 
variables reflecting the governance of firms. 
 
Financing frictions 
Since banks cannot observe managerial effort directly, they must assure that lending 
is incentive compatible. They must thus leave the entrepreneur with a large enough stake that  guarantees  high  effort  and,  in  turn,  a  high  probability  of  success  and  repayment.
3 
Lending is incentive compatible if, ex post, entrepren eurs prefer to apply high effort and to 
forgo private benefits, i.e. 
, /( )
e e e
j L j j j j L pv p v bI v I b p p . 
The entrepreneur's compensation 
e
j v  in case of success must thus lie above a certain 
threshold which depends on level of private benefits that could be consumed when shirking. 
This measure implicitly reflects the quality of corporate governance mechanisms and other 
institutional characteristics which are expected to determine the autonomy of insiders and 
their possibilities for misbehavior. From the bank's point of view, the incentive compatibility 
constraint restricts the amount of earnings which the firm can credibly pledge as a repayment 
of  external  credit:  (1 ) j j j j j i D I x T I . The  right  hand  side  is  the  firm's  pledgeable 
income or external financing capacity. 
Whether this constraint is binding or not depends on the size of a firm's pledgeable 
income relative to its financing needs, given by Dj = Ij - Aj. When technology  () j j j x f I  is 
concave, the firm's financing capacity increases less than proportionately at high investment 
levels while external financing needs rise linearly. At large investment levels, the constraint 
eventually  becomes  binding  as  Figure 1  illustrates. To replicate  the  empirical  regularities 
reported in Section 1, we assume that the credit constraint is binding for innovative firms but 
slack for standard firms, meaning that standard firms invest at the optimal scale where the 
return  is  equal  to  the  user  cost.  By  way  of  contrast,  investment  of  innovative  firms  is 
constrained by their debt capacity, raising more external funds to expand investment would 
violate the incentive constraint and lead to a high probability of failure. Investment is thus 
implicitly determined by the financing constraint  (1 )( ) ( ) c c c c c c c i I A I f I T I , which 
is illustrated on the right hand panel of Figure 1. There are two important implications. First, 
since investment is lower than the first best level, the firm earns an excess return ( 'c xu ) 
                                                 and, thus, has unexploited investment opportunities. Second, investment depends on own 
assets  c A  and institutional characteristics as reflected in the parameter  . 
[ Insert Figure 1 about here. ] 
In this model, innovative firms are more easily finance constrained for two reasons. 
First,  innovation  results  in  a  high  productivity  c   and boosts investment opportunities. 
Although more investment raises earnings and thereby also debt capacity, it increases one 
by one the need for external financing. Second, R&D spending in the early stage drains own 
resources and leaves  firms with lower residual assets  (1 ) c A A k  which again raises 
the need for more external funds to finance expansion investment. Compared to innovative 
growth companies, characterized with low residual assets but high investment opportunities, 
non-innovating firms are left with undiminished internal resources  c AA  and little growth 
potential on account of low productivity. We henceforth assume that innovative firms are 
constrained and standard firms not.
4 
 
Early stage R&D investment 
After entry, and before deciding on R&D spending, the entrepreneur learns the early 
stage success probability q' of the venture. We assume that the firm is fully able to self-
finance R&D costs internally so that no adverse selection problem arises in financing R&D 
spending.
5  When undertaking R&D, the firm incurs a fixed cost,  (1 )k which  is  partly 
reduced by an R&D subsidy at rate  , but can expect larger earnings  cu  on account of 
a higher productivity. Given that the firm survives the early stage only with probability  q', the 
net present value is  ' / (1 ) c q R k . When not spending on R&D, the net present value of 
the same firm would be  '/ u qR . The firm undertakes R&D if  ' / (1 ) ' / cu q R k q R . 
Since  the  early  stage  success  probability  reflects  the  heterogeneity  of  firms  in  their 
innovation potential, the critical type is given by  




Figure 2 illustrates how this cut-off value separates standard firms (values q' below q) from 
innovative firms (values q' above q). If g(q') is the density function of the firm distribution, the 
mass of standard firms  surviving the early stage  is 
0 ' ( ') '
q
u s q g q dq ,  while  the  mass of 
innovative  firms  surviving  to  the  expansion  stage  amounts  to 
1
' ( ') ' c q s q g q dq .  Average 
productivity  can  be  defined  as 





,  where  the  denominator  is  simply  the 
expected value of q' over all types of firms. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here.] 
Using  this  framework,  we  can  now  discuss  how  profit  taxation  affects  various 
business  decisions  and  aggregate  outcomes  when  part  of  firms  are  effectively  finance 
constrained. We first discuss the different impact of taxes on constrained and unconstrained 
firms and  thereby  also  highlight  the  differences  to  the  neoclassical  investment model.  In 
particular, we emphasize that taxes will not affect the business sector in a uniform way but 
will involve intensive (on expansion investment) and extensive effects (on innovation) that 
are importantly driven by finance constraints. We then study the effects of R&D subsidies on 
innovation and capital investment. In subsequent sections, we will reinterpret the discrete 
R&D decision as organizational choice along other dimensions: venture capital versus bank 
financing and the incorporation decision. In the end, we turn to rather different areas and 
shortly discuss how finance constraints might affect dividend payout behavior, comparative 
advantage in an international setting, and labor market performance. 
 
3. TAX REFORM 
This model of heterogeneous firms illustrates how the impact of taxes changes when 
firms are finance constrained. Suppose the tax liability of a successful firm is Tj =  (xj - iIj ) 
where Ij=Aj+Dj. Profits xj are thus taxed at a proportional rate  , and a share   of the total financing cost is deductible from the tax base, including interest on bank debt Dj as well as 
an imputed return on equity Aj.
6 The user cost of capital then becomes 
1
1
ui . As 
shown  above,  unconstrained  firms  choose  their  investment  scale  such  that  the  marginal 
return is equal to the user cost of capital,  '( ) uu f I u. As long as   < 1, the profit tax raises 
the  user  cost  above  the  rate  of  interest  on  loans  and  thereby  discourages  investment. 
Unconstrained firms thus act as predicted by traditional neoclassical investment theory (cf. 
Hall  and  Jorgensen,  1967,  Hassett  and  Hubbard,  2002).  The  distortion  of  investment 
incentives, as measured by the concept of marginal effective tax rates, can be substantial: 
empirical estimates of the elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost of capital 
range between -0.5 and -1.0 (see Hassett and Hubbard, 2002). 
In the tax reform literature, the ACE (allowance for corporate equity) tax system, as 
proposed  by  the  Capital  Taxes  Group  of  the  Institute  for  Fiscal  Studies  (1991),  plays  a 
prominent role. An ACE tax system allows for full deduction of (imputed) interest costs both 
on equity and debt which is replicated by setting   = 1. This tax leaves the user cost of 
capital unaffected, u=i, and therefore avoids any tax distortion of investment when firms are 
unconstrained as in the neoclassical case (cf. King, 1975; Boadway and Bruce, 1984; Bond 
and Devereux, 1995, 2003). If innovative firms were unconstrained as well and the R&D 
subsidy rate were equal to the tax rate, the tax system would be fully neutral not only towards 
expansion  investment  but  also  towards  the  innovation  decision  as  well  (extensive 
margin).The  same  would  hold  for  a  cash-flow  tax  system  which  allows  full  deduction  of 
investment expenses but, instead, denies deductions of interest cost (see cf. King, 1975; 
Boadway  and  Bruce,  1984;  Bond  and  Devereux,  2003).
7  Both  tax  systems  feature 
prominently in the tax reform literature, e.g. Devereux and Sorensen (2005), OECD (2007), 
                                                 and Auerbach, Devereux, and Simpson (2008). In this framework, the two tax systems are 
equivalent also when financing constraints are binding (see Keuschnigg and Ribi, 2009). 
How do profit taxes affect investment when credit constraints are binding? As shown 
in Section 2, expansion investment in this case is not determined by the user cost of capital, 
but by the incentive compatibility constraint (1 ) c c c c c i D I x T I . A positive tax liability 
Tc  reduces the pledgeable income and, thus, firms' capacity to raise external funding, forcing 
them to cut back on investment. The mechanism by which taxes affect investment, is thus 
completely  different  for  constrained  and  unconstrained  firms  so  that  taxes  will  have  a 
different impact on different types of firms. In other words, there will be level and composition 
effects.  This  will  also  be  important  for  aggregate  innovation,  since  innovative  growth 
companies are most likely to be constrained, will standard firms are not.  
How finance constraints change key results in tax theory and therefore modify the 
impact of taxes on innovation and average productivity, is most clearly seen if we restrict 
attention to an ACE tax which is fully neutral in the unconstrained case. To be neutral in the 
presence of innovation, the ACE system must grant full deduction of R&D cost as well which 
requires   = 1 and  = . We have seen that investment Iu of standard, unconstrained firms is 
independent of the tax rate   in an ACE system. Being a tax on rent, expected private profit 
falls by ˆ uu d , where the change in the tax rate is defined as  ˆ /(1 ) d . Note that, 
even if the tax system were not neutral, a tax-induced marginal change in Iu, by the envelope 
theorem, would not affect expected profit of unconstrained firms. 
A tax increase changes expected profits of innovative firms in a different way, by 
ˆ c c c d p dI , where  (1 )( ) c xu  is the after-tax excess return on investment. 
When  access  to  external  finance  is  restricted,  investment  cannot  be  expanded  until  its 
marginal return equals the user cost of capital which is equal to the loan rate i in a 'neutral' 
ACE tax system. Investing more would still earn a positive excess return and boost expected 








,  with  ( ) 0 mp   and  ˆ /(1 ) d .  The  R&D  decision results in an innovation threshold  q  which also separates constrained and unconstrained 
firms as in Figure 2. Since an ACE system sets the subsidy rate equal to the tax rate, i.e. 
ˆˆ , we find that investment falls, dIc < 0, when we use the cut-off value q as in Section 2. 
Since investment of constrained firms is sensitive to cash-flow, a tax on rent is no longer 
neutral because it tightens the finance constraint. Different from unconstrained firms where 
the envelope theorem applies, the marginal reduction in Ic leads to an additional profit loss 
which is proportional to the excess return on restricted investment. Hence, the tax reduces 
expected profit beyond the reduction in rent that would also occur with unconstrained firms.  
The innovation decision is driven by the profit gain as a result of R&D investment 
which is equal to the difference in expected profit of an innovative and a standard firm. Since 
the tax squeezes expected profit of an innovative firm relatively more than of a standard firm, 
it reduces the return to innovation. The cut-off value of the early stage success probability, 
(1 ) / ( ) cu q kR , which also separates standard from innovative firms, must thus rise. 
In consequence, the share sc of innovative firms and aggregate productivity  E  must both 
decline when the tax rate in a 'neutral' ACE system is increased. What is a neutral tax in the 
neoclassical model, is no longer neutral when  (part of)  firms are finance constrained . 
Aggregate investment declines both in the intensive and extensive margins. 
When innovative firms are constrained, profit taxes thus hurt them more strongly and 
dampen aggregate innovative activity on account of a negative selection effect . Due to the 
pre-existing investment distortion, the ensuing welfare loss is of first order even when starting 
from an untaxed equilibrium .  In fact, it is proportional to the excess return earned by 
constrained firms.  Hence,  the negative consequences are more severe the tighter the 
financing constraints  are.  It thus seems a preferred strategy of tax reform to modify  the 
system in a way that reduces the negative impact on innovative and financially constrained 
firms.  The extra  activity of firms which earn an excess return on investment, promises 
important  efficiency  gains.  It is important to emphasize that these efficiency gains have 
nothing to do with innovation spillovers and other external benefits from innovative firms, but 
result exclusively from the relaxation of finance constraints. One such possibility is a tax cut cum base broadening strategy. Many countries have 
seen such reform over the last three decades, although presumably for other reasons. The 
average statutory corporate income tax rate of 17 OECD countries has dropped from above 
50.9% in 1982 to 30.8% in 2006 (OECD, 2007). Over the same time period, depreciation 
allowances have dropped in more than half of these countries, implying a broadening of the 
tax base. In the present framework, we can examine tax base broadening by reducing the 
share   of financing costs that can be deducted from the base. Starting out from a pure ACE 
system with   =   > 0 and   = 1, we may thus consider a reduction of   to broaden the tax 
base, and then cut the tax rate   to keep the reform revenue neutral. Starting out from a pure 
ACE system where the tax rate does not affect the user cost of capital, a small cut in the tax 
rate has no impact on investment of standard firms. However, restricting the deduction   of 
interest expenses clearly inflates the user cost and discourages investment Iu. 
By  way of contrast, the tax cut  stimulates investment  of  innovative firms  because 
investment is sensitive to cash-flow, whereas the reduction in   has the opposite effect. In 
Keuschnigg  and  Ribi  (2010)  we  show  that  the  positive  effect  dominates  which  boosts 
investment  Ic.  The  policy  implicitly  redistributes  from  standard  to  innovative  firms.  Since 
innovative  firms  are  constrained  and  earn  an  excess  return,  the  marginal  investment 
expansion makes innovative firms even more profitable whereas a marginal change in Iu has 
no effect on expected profit of standard firms. Given that the policy makes innovative firms 
relatively more profitable, the returns to R&D increase, the innovation threshold q falls and 
more firms engage in R&D. The revenue neutral tax cut cum base broadening policy shifts 
investment from standard to innovative firms, induces a larger share of firms to innovate and, 
thus, boosts average productivity  E . The policy yields aggregate efficiency gains that are, 
again, proportional to the excess return on investment of constrained, innovative firms. 
 
4.  INNOVATION AND R&D SUBSIDIES 
Incentives  for  private  R&D  play  an  important  role  in  most  countries'  innovation 
policies. Two main reasons are commonly stated why policy should promote innovation in private companies: positive spillovers and financing constraints. The first argument, dating 
back to Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962), follows from the observation that innovating firms 
often cannot fully appropriate the output from private R&D. Other companies can at least 
partly  use  the  innovation  outcomes,  thus  benefiting  from  positive  spillovers.  Since  they 
cannot reap the full social return on R&D investments, firms tend to invest too little in R&D 
which  creates  a  case for  strengthening  R&D  incentives.  Public  support  can take  several 
forms:  most  common  is  direct  funding  in  the  form  of  government  contracts,  competitive 
grants or subsidized loans. However, in recent years, fiscal incentives like tax credits have 
become more important (OECD, 2008). 
The  empirical  literature  has  extensively  studied  the  effects  of  these  measures  on 
private R&D. An important concern, especially in the case of direct funding, is that public 
support might simply substitute for private R&D spending and lead to crowding-out effects. In 
their  survey  of  studies  that  measure  the  effectiveness  of  direct  public  funding  of  private 
sector R&D, David, Hall, and Toole (2000) indeed emphasize a large ambiguity in empirical 
findings on this question. With regard to fiscal incentives, the empirical evidence is more 
consistently positive. Hall and Van Reenen (2000) conclude that one dollar in tax credits 
leads to about one dollar of additional business R&D. In their cross-country study, Bloom, 
Griffith and Van Reenen (2002) find that when tax credits reduce the cost of R&D by 10%, 
one can expect the level of R&D activity to rise by roughly 10% in the long run. 
The second common rationale for public support refers to financing constraints of 
innovative firms. Even more than with standard investment, the quality of inventions and their 
market potential is difficult to judge by outside investors who are not directly involved in the 
innovation process. Hence, the entrepreneurial effort towards R&D intensive investment is 
largely unobservable to outside investors. For these reasons, innovating firms find it even 
more difficult to raise external finance for R&D purposes than for more standard physical 
investment.
8 The empirical literature confirms that capital costs are higher for R&D  intensive 
investment than for standard investment, especially for small firms (cf. Hall, 20 02; Hall and 
                                                 Lerner, 2009). Consistent with the fact that these firms mainly rely on internal resources to 
finance their innovation activities, the correlation between investment and own cash flow is 
also significantly higher for the R&D investment category (Brown and Petersen, 2009).  
How effective is public R&D support when firms are subject to financing constraints 
for  these  activities?  There  are  a  few  empirical  studies  that  shed  light  on  this  question. 
Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005) study the relationship between financing and innovation in 
small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) in Finland. Capital market imperfections prove to 
be  an  obstacle for  innovative  activities  and  the growth  of  these  companies.  Government 
funding of business  R&D  is found to be an important complement to capital markets. In 
industries that depend more strongly on external finance, government funding significantly 
stimulates R&D activity, leading also to more growth-oriented firms. Czarnitzki (2006) reports 
similar findings for SMEs in West Germany, whose R&D activities are constrained by both 
internal and external resources. Public funding raises their probability to engage in R&D by 
24 percentage points.  
This last result also points to a discrete modeling of R&D activity as in our theoretical 
framework. A subsidy to the innovation cost k directly reduces the amount of private R&D 
spending.  Hence,  the  expected  net  present  value  of  the  innovation  strategy  rises  which 
induces  more  firms  to  innovate  and  spend  on  R&D.  The  subsidy  becomes  even  more 
effective when firms experience problems with external funding because R&D drains own 
resources  and  thereby  limits  the  amount  of  possible  self-financing  to  implement  the 
innovation with subsequent capital investments. These firms cannot exploit their full growth 
potential that would be possible with their more productive technology. The constraint on 
expansion investment reduces an innovating firm's profits and, thus, reduces the returns to 
R&D and the level of innovative activity on the extensive margin. A tax relief or a subsidy   
on private R&D spending leaves innovative firms with more internal assets  (1 ) c A A k  
which are still available for self-financing a larger part of expansion investment. An  R&D 
subsidy  thus  relaxes  the financing  constraint  and  enables  innovative  firms  to  raise more 
external funds and to invest capital Ic  at a larger scale. Firms grow larger and come closer to their  efficient  scale.  Due  to  the  excess  return  on  constrained  investment,  the  additional 
growth boosts expected profit of an innovative firm. In consequence, innovation becomes 
even  more  profitable  which  induces  more firms  to  invest  in  R&D.  Brighi,  Corigliano,  and 
Torluccio (2009) confirm that R&D subsidies also stimulate external financing and equipment 
investment on top of R&D. In Japan as well, the public support programs for innovative firms 
under  the  SME  Creative  Business  Promotion  Law  strengthen  the  asset  growth  in  the 
participating companies (Honjo and Harada, 2006). 
The fact that R&D tax credits apply to a rather broad group of firms and thus leads to 
large  losses  in  tax  revenue,  raises  concerns  with  regard  to  their  cost-effectiveness  (cf. 
Griffith, Redding, and Van Reenen, 2001). In our theoretical model, we can in fact examine 
whether an increase in the subsidy rate   that is financed in a revenue neutral way by a 
parallel increase in the tax rate, is still able to boost innovation, or whether this is a self-
defeating policy strategy. Starting out from an ACE system with   = 1 and   =   >0, this 
revenue neutral policy has unambiguously negative effects on standard firms, even though 
the ACE tax is neutral with respect to unconstrained investment Iu. Standard firms cannot 
benefit at all from the larger R&D subsidy, but the tax increase eats into their profits. The 
effect on investment incentives of innovative firms is, a priori, ambiguous. A larger subsidy   
leaves firms with more internal resources and allows them to expand equipment investment. 
The tax increase, however, reduces the firms' pledgeable income and, thus, their ability to 
raise external funds which restricts investment Ic. In Keuschnigg and Ribi (2010), we show 
that the combined effect is positive if the number of innovative relative to standard firms is 
not too large. Standard firms are clearly net tax payers in this scheme, and the investment 
distortion is zero to the first order with an ACE tax in place. The revenue extracted from 
these firms thus entails no efficiency loss. When there are few innovative and many standard 
firms, the government budget constraint implies that a very small tax increase on all firms 
suffices to finance a relatively large R&D subsidy for relatively few innovating firms. Such a 
scenario clearly redistributes from away from standard firms, reduces the net present value 
of tax and subsidy payments of innovative firms, thereby relaxes their financing constraint and helps these firms to invest more. Since investment of constrained innovative firms yields 
an excess return, these firms become more profitable beyond the direct net tax subsidy. In 
consequence,  the  higher  returns  to  R&D  stimulate  innovation  and  boost  aggregate 
productivity.  This  revenue  neutral  redistribution  policy  yields  efficiency  gains  that  are 
proportional  to  the  excess  return  on  constrained  investment.  Allowing  firms  to  exploit 
investment opportunities with a strictly positive net value to a larger extent clearly boosts 
aggregate income and welfare. 
As these last two sections have shown, the presence of financing constraints has 
important implications for the effects of tax policy. Profit taxes such as an ACE (or cash-flow) 
tax do not affect the user cost of capital and, therefore, are neutral towards investment of 
unconstrained firms. However, they still hurt innovative companies by reducing cash-flow and 
pledgeable income which prevents them to fully exploit the investment opportunities created 
by early stage innovation. In consequence, fewer firms will engage in R&D so that innovation 
and  productivity  decline.  Since  constrained firms  earn  an  excess return,  the reduction  in 
investment leads to a first order welfare loss. Given that constrained and unconstrained firms 
coexist,  there  are  several  possibilities  for  revenue  neutral  policy  changes  that  implicitly 
redistribute towards innovative firms. Examples are an R&D subsidy financed with a higher 
profit tax or a tax base cum base broadening policy. These redistributive, revenue neutral 
policies  help  to  relax  finance  constraints  of  innovative  firms  and  allow  them  to  exploit 
unrealized investment opportunities with an excess return. Such redistribute policies  thus 
raise  innovation  and  efficiency.  We  next  turn  to  the  role  of  more  active  financial 
intermediaries such as venture capital, and to the implications of finance constraints on other 
business decisions. 
 
5. VENTURE CAPITAL VERSUS BANK FINANCING Young high-tech companies with a high growth potential often receive at least part of 
their  external  funding  from  venture  capitalists.
9  These financiers  have  a lot of   industry 
experience and managerial know-how.  Venture capital (VC) firms are thus able to support 
their portfolio companies with advice and professional support, on top of supplying part of the 
external financing (see Cumming and Johan, 2007). Their advice and monitoring activity may 
not only raise the survival prospects of firms but can also often facilitate their access to other 
sources of financing. In the U.S., where the VC industry is most  mature, VC financed R&D 
accounted only for around 3% of corporate R&D activities from 1983 to 1992, but generated 
about 8% of industrial innovation and even more in later periods (Kortum and Lerner, 2000). 
During the 1990s, more than 30% of initial public offerings  were backed by VC (Gompers 
and Lerner, 2001).  
However, active monitoring and advice also makes VC more expensive than passive 
bank loans and is, thus, not appropriate  for all young firms.  Firms must have large enough 
growth opportunities to favor the involvement of  a VC.
10 We thus replace the distribution of 
firms by their early stage success probability  ' [0,1] q  with a productivity distribution across 
firms  in  an  interval  01 [ , ](see  Keuschnigg,  2009,  for  details).  We  also  replace  the 
discrete innovation decision in the preceding sections with a discrete choice between bank 
financing only and VC and (residual) bank financing as the other option.  
An entrepreneur with little own wealth must raise external funds and chooses from 
different sources. All intermediaries are assumed to be perfectly competitive and will supply 
funding only to the extent that lending is incentive compatible. A passive bank loan requires 
the payment of a loan rate, but offers no further assistance. In contrast, VCs not only provide 
funds but actively monitor the firm and provide advice (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2001, and ). 
This  value  increasing  activity  results,  for  instance,  in  a  shorter  time  until  a  product  is 
introduced in the market and contributes to the professionalization of the firm in other ways 
(Hellmann and Puri, 2000). It is assumed that the active involvement of a VC boosts the 
                                                 expected value of the firm by raising the success probability by p
V to a level of p + p
V  if both 
the entrepreneur and the VC exert high effort. Since the VC's activity is not verifiable and 
observable either, a double moral hazard problem emerges. The higher survival chances, 
however, is assured only if both agents are incentivized ex post by retaining a large enough 
stake in the firm. In other words, two incentive constraints must now be fulfilled for lending 
with a high repayment probability to be incentive compatible.  
To assure high managerial effort as well as advice and monitoring, and given the 
effort costs of these activities, both the entrepreneur (analogous to Section 2) and also the 
VC must each retain a large enough stake in the firm's future cash-flow. Compensating the 
advisory input on top of the cost of capital makes VC financing more expensive than bank 
loans. Firms are thus willing to cede to VCs no more than the smallest incentive compatible 
cash-flow share that just guarantees their advisory input. Given that VCs are competitive and 
receive a repayment equal to the required compensation for advice, firms will ask for a level 
of funding that allows VCs no more than break even with a zero expected profit. Having 
secured an active role of the VC and already part of the external funding, firms leverage their 
own wealth augmented by VC funds with additional bank loans to further expand investment. 
Hence,  the  marginal  funds  for  additional  investment  are  raised  from  banks.  With  larger 
investment, repayment of bank loans rises as well so that the entrepreneur's residual profit 
income shrinks accordingly. Investment and bank lending can thus be expanded until the 
entrepreneur's share shrinks to the minimum amount necessary that prevents shirking to 
keep the entrepreneurial effort high. 
Since firms can always finance with bank loans alone, although possibly at a smaller 
scale,  the  question  is  whether  they  should  additionally  apply  for  VC  funding.  Since  VC 
financing is more costly, it is not preferred by all firms equally. Keuschnigg (2009) considers 
a  situation,  characterized  by  certain  parameter  conditions,  where  entrepreneurs  with  low 
productivity prospects rely only on bank credits since VC advice is not sufficiently valuable 
from them to warrant the extra cost. Firms with very high productivity find that the value of 
VC advice more than compensates for the larger cost of VC funding. There is thus a clear sorting  in the market for  business financing.  Firms  with  very  high  productivity  attract  VC 
financing  which  is  further  leveraged  by  additional  bank  loans  while  less  productive  firms 
finance themselves exclusively with standard bank loans. This replicates the stylized fact that 
VC financing is mainly concentrated among the most innovative start-ups with the largest 
growth potential. 
Taking the perspective of this framework, public policy can influence the VC sector in 
several  ways.
11  On the supply side,   one important channel by which   the  volume  of VC 
financing is affected, relates to the regulatory  restrictions of public investment funds. In the 
U.S.,  the  Department  of  Labor's  clarification  of  the  'prudent  man'  rule  in  1979  had a 
significant impact on  VC fundraising (Gompers and Lerner, 1998). There are two ways in 
which a higher supply of VC funds might benefit firms: first, it should reduce the capital cost 
of VC firms which translates into lower financing costs of firms in a competitive VC market. 
Second, to the extent that  individual VC firms are able to invest  the additional funds  in a 
larger portfolio of firms, they might gain further experience and be able to add more value to 
their individual firm investments. With VC advice is more productive, VC funding should be 
attractive for a larger range of firms. If, for both reasons,  a larger share of firms attracts VC 
financing, aggregate productivity and innovation based growth should be stimulated. 
The demand for VC is sensitive  to a number of subsidy and tax measures.  Small 
high-growth companies which are often financed by VC, are also typically the target of public 
subsidy  programs  that  aim  at  stimulating  business  creation   as  a  means  to  promote 
innovation.  In  the  U.S. ,  the  Small  Business  Innovation  Research  (SBIR)  program 
substantially  enhanced  the  participating  firms'  employment  and  sales  growth,  and  it 
increased their  likelihood to receive VC financing (Lerner, 1999).   In the model, start -up 
subsidies reduce the amount of external financing and, for a given amount of  pledgeable 
income, relaxes the financing constraint. In consequence, firms can  raise more external VC 
and bank financing. Since the effect is stronger for  VC backed investments, more firms are 
induced to apply for VC financing. Given that innovative firms on average get more profitable, 
                                                 these  subsidies  are  likely  to  strengthen  incentives  for  early  stage  R&D  investments  and 
entrepreneurial entry. Start-up subsidies thus raise demand for VC financing both on the 
intensive and extensive margins. 
As in the model with pure bank financing, profit taxes also reduce innovative firms' 
pledgeable income and, thereby, restrict external financing and the level of investment. Due 
to  their  larger  size,  VC  backed  firms  are  more  strongly  affected  so  that  VC  financing 
becomes relatively less attractive as compared to pure bank financing. Reflecting a selection 
effect, profit taxes should reduce the share of new firms using VC financing. In addition, the 
profit tax reduces the net present value of a new firm at the date of entry before selecting into 
one of the two financing modes. Reflecting a level effect, profit taxation should thus reduce 
entry and shrink the number of new, high-tech start-ups. Entry will also depend on the tax 
burden  on  the  alternative  career  option  of  a  potential  entrepreneur,  i.e.  dependent 
employment elsewhere, net of labor taxes. Occupational choice is thus driven by the relative 
effective tax burden on wage and profit income. To sum up, an increase in profit taxes, 
relative to wage taxes, should have a negative level effect on account of reduced entry, and 
a negative selection effect, on account of fewer entrants demanding VC financing. 
Profit income can accrue in different forms, dividends or capital gains.  During the 
start-up period, the return to investment of both entrepreneurs and VCs mainly consists of 
capital gains. The capital gains tax might therefore constitute a strong disincentive to VC 
investment. Empirical studies, however, point to the fact that a large share of (institutional) 
venture investors are not subject to the individual capital gains tax so that VC fund raising 
and,  thus,  VC  supply  might  not  be  affected  too  much  (cf.  Poterba,  1989;  Gompers  and 
Lerner, 1999). VC demand by entrepreneurs, on the other hand, is significantly reduced by 
capital  gains  taxes.  On  the  other  hand,  corporate  taxes  are  levied  at  the  firm  level  and 
reduce the value of firms irrespective of whether profit is distributed in terms of dividends or 
capital gains. In particular, corporate taxes reduce returns to VC investors and entrepreneurs 
as well. Studying data on 14 European countries, Da Rin, Nicodano and Sembenelli (2006) 
find that a lower corporate capital gains tax stimulates the creation of highly innovative firms. They interpret this as evidence that the tax cut also boosts VC monitoring incentives, thus 
stimulating firm performance and VC investment, a point which is emphasized in Keuschnigg 
and Nielsen (2004). 
 
6. INCORPORATION 
The tax treatment of entrepreneurial income to a large extent depends on the firm's 
organizational form. Income from non-corporate firms or sole proprietorships is subject to 
personal income taxes which tend to be steeply progressive in most countries. Corporate 
income, on the other hand, is first subject to corporate tax, and subsequently to dividend and 
capital gains taxes at the shareholder level.
12 The total effective tax on corporate income also 
depends on measures to alleviate the potential double taxation, either by applying reduced 
tax rates on dividends or capital gains, or by some form of tax credi t for prepaid corporate 
tax. Some countries even tax according to the so called classical system where there is full 
double  taxation  of  corporate  profits.  The  different  tax  treatment  of  income  from  sole 
proprietorships  and  corporate  firms  is  one  important  factor  influencing   the  relative 
attractiveness of the two alternative organizational forms. 
However,  the  choice  of  organizational  form  is  also  importantly  driven  by  other 
economic  factors.  Corporate  entities  must  comply  with  tight  accounting  and  reporting 
standards  and  book  keeping  regulations.  On  the  one  hand,  this  makes  them  more 
transparent for outside investors, reduces the informational asymmetry, makes insiders more 
accountable  to  outside  stakeholders  and  narrows  down  the  room  for  managerial 
misbehavior.  Via  this  channel,  the  corporate  form  improves  firms'  access  to  external 
financing. On the other hand, the tighter reporting requirements impose extra administrative 
overhead costs which make this legal form more expensive.  Another difference is that 
entrepreneurs  are liable with their full private wealth   whereas  the corporate form offers 
limited liability and protects the private wealth of entrepreneurs in case of bankruptcy. 
                                                 To  explain  how  taxes  and  the  quality  of  the  legal  environment  as  reflected  in 
corporate law affect firms' choice of organizational form, one may again consider the model 
set out in Section 2.
13 The discrete choice now relates to the incorporation decision, i.e. 
whether to adopt the corporate legal form or   stay non-corporate. We also abstract from 
productivity differences    of different types of firms. However, we argue that tighter book 
keeping  standards result  in a  greater  transparency  of firms  which reduces  information 
problems, makes insiders more accountable and thereby narrows down the private benefits 
that managers could potentially enjoy when shirking. Corporate firms thus have a lower  , 
and therefore need a lower  income share  to keep them properly incentivized.  In turn, the 
company's pledgeable income  rises and  allows firms  to raise more external capital.  This 
mechanism  essentially  formalizes  the  argument  that  the  corporate form  is  valuable  in 
improves access to the capital market. On the other hand, the corporate form is not for free. 
Firms need to invest in their reporting and book keeping procedures  to comply to the legal 
standards which is captured in a fixed cost k (and replaces the fixed R&D cost of Section 2). 
This alone would explain the impact of incorporation on the extensive and intensive margins, 
i.e.  the  share  of  firms  choosing  to  incorporate,  and  the  larger  scale  of  investment  that 
corporate firms can realize on account of better access to external capital. 
To discuss the importance of limited liability, assume that on top of financial assets A, 
entrepreneurs are also endowed with additional private wealth H, such as their own family 
house.  This  private  asset  cannot  be  directly  invested  in  the  firm,  but  it  may  serve  as  a 
collateral with the bank. Arguably, the consumption value (1 +  )H is higher for the individual 
than the collateral value H for the bank, for instance due to an additional consumer surplus 
from living in one's own house. When the entrepreneur adopts the non-corporate form and 
runs  the  firm  as  a  sole  proprietorship,  banks  can  seize  not  only  the  financial  assets  A 
invested in the firm, but also the private assets H when the business fails. Losing her private 
asset might be exceedingly costly for the entrepreneur so that she looks for ways to protect 
it. Incorporation is a possibility to do so. When incorporating, the entrepreneur can choose 
                                                 whether or not she wants to put up her private asset H as a collateral to secure additional 
bank credit. On the positive side, offering H as a collateral allows the firm to raise additional 
credit  to  finance  a  larger  investment  and  thereby  to  boost  expected  income.
14  On the 
negative side,  losing the consumer surplus due to the higher consumption  value  of the 
private asset in case of bankruptcy might reduce expected utility too much. Therefore, if they 
are very risk averse (in the sense of attaching a high consumer value on the private asset) , 
entrepreneurs  prefer  limited  liability  (see  Egger,  Keuschnigg,  and  Winner,  2009) .  This 
discussion shows that limited liability does not unambiguously favor incorporation. If the 
consumer value is low, entrepreneurs would put up their private assets as collateral anyway, 
irrespective of whether they incorporate or not. A similar point is heuristically stated in 
Berkowitz and White (2004). 
Since incorporation is costly and results in fixed overhead  costs k of complying to 
book  keeping  standards,  the  expected  surplus  of  a  corporate  firm  c  must  exceed  the 
expected surplus  u  of the same firm in non-corporate form, in order to induce at least some 
firms to incorporate. Figure 2 above is conveniently reinterpreted: entrepreneurs with less 
promising ventures and an early stage success probability q'<q prefer to stay non-corporate. 
Firms  with  larger  potential  prefer  to  incorporate  and  invest  in  the  accounting  system  to 
comply  with  reporting  and  accounting  regulations.  The  greater  transparency  and 
accountability allows them to raise more external capital and exploit their business idea to a 
larger extent. For this reason, corporate firms should be larger, given identical other firm 
characteristics such as factor productivity. 
The  differential  tax  treatment  of  corporations  and  sole  proprietorships  affects  the 
incorporation decision and leads a margin of firms to change their organizational form for tax 
reasons. The model predicts that the share of corporate firms relative to sole proprietorships 
is higher the lower the corporate tax rate, dividend and capital gains taxes, and the higher 
the personal income tax. MacKie-Mason and Gordon (1997) provide evidence that double 
taxation of corporate income is a significant impediment to incorporation. Using historical 
                                                 U.S. data, Goolsbee (1998) finds that higher corporate taxation is associated with higher 
non-corporate  capital,  but  the  economic  significance  is  rather  small.  However,  exploiting 
cross-sectional  rather than  time-series  data,  Goolsbee  (2004)  finds  that  the  sensitivity  of 
incorporation choice to tax differences is substantially larger than in previous studies which is 
also  confirmed  for  European  countries  by  De  Mooij  and  Nicodème  (2008)  and  Egger, 
Keuschnigg, and Winner (2009). Gordon (1998) and Cullen and Gordon (2007) emphasize 
that  the  potential  to  take  advantage  of  lower  tax  burdens  via  incorporation  stimulates 
entrepreneurial activity. 
Institutional factors also play an empirically important role for organizational choice. 
The  model  suggests  that  well  developed  accounting  and  reporting  standards,  in  making 
corporate  firms  more  transparent,  facilitate  access  to  external  funding,  leading  to  more 
investment, larger profits and favoring  incorporation. By way of contrast, compliance and 
overhead costs associated with the corporate legal form should discourage incorporation. 
The empirical study of Egger, Keuschnigg and Winner (2009) confirms these hypotheses. 
They also find that anti-director rights which measure the control and influence of outside 
shareholders on managers (La Porta et al., 1998), have a negative impact on incorporation. 
Accessing data from 52 countries, Demirgüc-Kunt, Love and Maksimovic (2006) also find 
that institutional determinants like the efficiency of legal systems and bankruptcy processes, 
a low regulatory burden and well developed financial markets make the corporate form more 
valuable and encourage incorporation. 
 
7.  DIVIDEND TAXATION 
Shareholders  receive  the  return  on  investment  mainly  in  two  ways:  dividends  or 
capital gains.
15 Their tax treatment, however, differs importantly: often, dividends are taxed at 
a higher rate than capital gains,  and  tax payment on the latter is  typically deferred until 
realization, which also implies a lower effective tax rate. Despite this tax discri mination, a lot 
of firms nevertheless pay out dividends on a regular basis  -  a fact which  was  termed a 
                                                 "dividend  puzzle"  by  Black  (1976).  Explanations  of  payout  behavior  are  driven  by  the 
presence  of  information  asymmetry  between  firm  insiders  and  outside  shareholders.  For 
instance,  the  signaling  theory  of  dividends  as  in  Bhattacharya  (1979)  presumes  that 
managers pay dividends in order to transmit information to investors about future prospects 
of the firm. An alternative approach claims that managers with empire building tendencies 
want to retain earnings within a firm and invest free cash flow in projects that might not carry 
much value for shareholders (Jensen, 1986). Shareholders would then pressure for dividend 
payments to increase investment efficiency. A more recent model by Chetty and Saez (2009) 
focuses  on  the  incentives  of  managers  to  invest  in  productive  projects  which  benefit  all 
shareholders, or in pet projects that increase only manager utility. Incentive pay in the form of 
company shares induces managers to pay dividends.
16 
Empirical studies on dividend taxation   or payout policies   in general  confirm the 
relevance of agency problems.
17 The quality of corporate governance and legal protection is 
thus importantly related to the level of dividen d payments.  La Porta, Lopez -de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (2000a) show that in countries with strong minority shareholder rights, 
firms  make  higher  dividend  payouts  than  in countries  with  a  lower  quality  of  investor 
protection. This supports the hypothesis that investors use their shareholder rights to force 
firms to  pay out  cash.  Pointing to a similar agency concern,  Christie and Nanda (1994) 
demonstrate that the announcement of a tax on undistributed corporate profits in 1936 led to 
higher share prices. The reaction was particularly strong among firms with traditionally low 
payouts. The fact that investors welcomed  the larger dividend pay-out at  the expense of 
internal reinvestment of free cash-flow, points to shareholder concerns of  inefficient internal 
investments by managers. 
Particularly rich evidence became available by the 2003 tax reform in the U.S.  Until 
2003, the U.S. pursued the classical regime of full double taxation, i.e. a firm's income was 
                                                 
 taxed by the corporate tax, and any dividends distributed subsequently were fully subject to 
personal income taxes at the shareholder level. In 2003, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation  Act  reduced  the  tax  rate  on  dividends  to  a  maximum  of  15%.  This  huge 
reduction  in  the  tax  rate  led  to  considerable  changes  in  firms'  payout  policies  and 
valuations.
18 Analyzing only the first quarter following the passage of the tax r eform, Blouin, 
Raedy and Shackelford (2004)  find a 9% increase of aggregate dividend payments. The 
changes  were  higher  in  firms  with  high  levels  of  inside  ownership,  confirming  the 
effectiveness of incentive pay with self -interested managers. However, the rise in dividend 
payments seems to be driven by one -time large dividends, and not by a general rise in 
regular payments. Taking into account four quarters after the tax reform, Chetty and Saez 
(2005) report more substantial effects. They find that dividend payments increased by 20% 
following the tax cut. Very striking is the increase in the number of firms that  didn't pay 
dividends before and started  payouts  after the reform.  The share of companies paying 
dividends rose from 20% in the fourth quarter of 2002 to 25% in the second quarter of 2004. 
Firms paying regular dividends were also significantly more likely to increase their payments, 
and  the  number  of  one -time  dividends  rose  substantially.  The  paper  confirms  strong 
heterogeneity of the effects across firms. The changes in payout behavior were stronger in 
firms where top executives held more shares. In addition, companies with high  shares of 
taxable institutional ownership or large independent shareholders on the board of directors 
responded more strongly which points to an effective monitoring role of  these agents. The 
model developed in Chetty and Saez (2009) can explain these observations, stipulating that 
managers have a desire for pet projects but can be influenced by incentive pay in the form of 
firm shares and by monitoring via the board of directors. 
One question regarding the observed increase in dividend payments is whether they 
only substituted for share repurchases. This would imply that firms merely change d the 
relative weights of the different ways in which they distribute cash flow but did not necessarily 
raise its total amount. Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner (2007) show that firms which initiated 
                                                 dividend payments after the tax cut, indeed were more likely to reduce share repurchases, 
whereas Blouin, Raedy, and Shackelford (2007) confirm substitution for a larger group of 
firms. Chetty and Saez (2005), however, can show that at least in the group of dividend-
initiating firms, the total amount of payouts rose significantly. Overall, these studies confirm 
that agency concerns are an important motivator for investors to exert pressure on firms and 
make them pay out dividends. In firms with sufficient cash flow to finance their productive 
investment needs, a reduction in the dividend tax helps to align investors' and managers' 
interest. Indeed, Chetty and Saez (2009) show that a corporate income tax leads to lower 
efficiency losses than the dividend tax in this situation. 
 
8.  FINANCE AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
Corporate finance can importantly affect macroeconomic outcomes. Since innovative 
firms are most likely to be finance constrained, the quality of corporate finance determines 
the expansion of innovative industries. In open economies, the structural characteristics of 
the financial system and the financial robustness of firms can, thus,  importantly shape a 
country's  comparative  advantage  in  financially  dependent  sectors.  Hence,  the  results  of 
classical  trade  theory  which  emphasizes  differences  in  relative  factor  endowments  and 
productivity across countries as determinants of international trade, must be modified. An 
extended  version  of  the  model  of  Section  2  can  endogenously  explain  how  corporate 
governance indicators and measures of financial development affect trading patterns (see 
also Egger and Keuschnigg, 2010).
19 Potential entrepreneurs can again set up a firm in  the 
innovative sector. Since entrepreneurial inputs are crucial for the success of the venture, the 
innovative sector is assumed labor intensive. For simplicity, investment I per firm is fixed, but 
the productivity of that investment may vary widely in the sense that the output per firm is a 
draw from  [0, ). In order to incentivize the manager to exert high effort, he must be paid 
a minimum compensation, which reduces the firm’s pledgeable income. Some firms with a 
low productivity   and low earnings are denied external funding when pledgeable income 
                                                 turns out too low for lending I-A to be incentive compatible. The financial market frictions thus 
constrain  the  innovative  sector  along  its  extensive  margin  at  the  lower  end  of  firm 
productivity. Workers as well as the potential entrepreneurs who do not start their own firm, 
are employed in a standard, capital intensive sector. This traditional sector combines labor 
and  capital  to  produce  a  standard  good  and  is  not  finance  constrained.  The  industrial 
structure within a country thus depends on the relative prices of the produced goods, but also 
on financial institutions. The key insight is, that the innovative sector becomes larger when 
the quality of corporate governance mechanisms improves which reduce managerial agency 
costs  and  relax  finance  constraints,  and  when  firms  are  financially  more  robust  and  are 
endowed  with  more  own  resources.  Ju  and  Wei  (2005,  2008)  also  emphasize  that  the 
institutional quality of the financial sector supports the expansion of financially constrained 
sectors. Different financial development of countries also prevents factor price equalization 
which would otherwise hold in a standard trade model with identical technologies.
20 
Clearly, when part of the firms are financially constrained,  the distribution of financial 
capital within a country plays a role for comparative advantage. The amount of wealth in the 
hands of innovative entrepreneurs  determines the financial robustness of firms in terms of 
own resources and importantly influences  the relative  size of the innovative, financially 
constrained sectors. Wynne (2005) discusses this point in the context of family firms and the 
role of bequests as an important transmitter of wealth. Further, Antr às and Caballero (2009) 
argue  that whereas trade and international capital flows are substitutes  classical trade 
models,  the  presence  of  financial  frictio ns  makes  goods  trade  and  capital  flows 
complementary. Trade integration  can raise the flow of capital into economies with less -
developed financial markets. 
There is substantial empirical evidence on the importance of financial development 
for trade patterns. Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005) find that finance substantially influences the 
industrial specialization in OECD countries. The quantitative impact is even greater than the 
effect  of  differences  in  human  capital.  Beck  (2003)  shows  that  countries  with  better -
                                                 developed financial sectors have higher export shares and trade balances in industries which 
rely more heavily on external finance. The same also holds for countries that have better 
access to international equity markets (Manova, 2008a). As Manova (2008b) demonstrates, 
the increase in export volumes associated with better financial markets is to a large part due 
to  firm  selection  into  exporting,  highlighting  the  importance  of  the  extensive  margin  of 
exporting. In sectors that are more financially vulnerable, countries with better developed 
financial systems also export a wider variety of products. 
 
9.  FINANCE AND LABOR MARKETS 
Financing constraints are also important for labor market outcomes, and labor market 
policies can feed back on the firm's ability to raise external capital and invest. Given that 
investment  and  labor  demand  of  firms  tend  to  move  together,  financial  frictions  can 
importantly  affect  aggregate  employment.  To  formalize  this  argument,  one  may  again 
consider the model in Section 2. For simplicity, one may assume that a firm's labor demand 
is proportional to firm size Ij, j = u,c.
21 The entrepreneur's incentive compatibility constraint is 
(1 ) j j j j j j i D I x wI T I , where the tax liability amounts to Tj =  (xj-wIj - iIj) and the 
wage w is the same for all workers. The payroll subtracts from pledgeable income. When 
innovative firms are financially constrained, a higher wage rate must reduce the available 
external credit and the firms' leverage. Less investment Ic implies a lower labor demand. In 
standard  firms,  labor  demand  and  investment  are  determined  by  '( ) uu f I u w   where 
1
1
ui . A higher wage discourages hiring. It is not clear a priori which type of firms 
responds  more  strongly  to  rising  wages:  the  standard  firms'  behavior  is  guided  by  the 
elasticity of the revenue function f(I), whereas innovative firms' labor demand is determined 
by  the  tightness  of  the  financing  constraint.  However,  because  of  the  presence  of 
constrained firms, better institutions of corporate governance or larger own equity of firms 
now become new fundamental determinants of aggregate employment. 
                                                 Labor market protection and high unemployment benefits and social assistance tend 
to boost  wages and reduce employment in of both constrained and unconstrained firms, 
although the specific mechanism is entirely different. For instance, generous unemployment 
insurance boosts the outside option of workers and consequently raises their reservation 
wages  (Fishe,  1982;  Feldstein  and  Poterba,  1984),  which  are  at  least  partly  shifted  to 
employers and, thus, inflate a firms' labor costs. High personal income taxes similarly tend to 
be shifted partly to employers. On the firm side, firing taxes or severance pay tend to raise 
wage costs. Calcagno, Kraeussl, and Monticone (2008) study a recent reform of severance 
indemnities in Italy. There, firms must set aside each year 1/13.5 of a worker's annual salary, 
and  the  resulting  capital  is  paid  to  workers  upon  separation.  Before  the  reform,  the 
accumulating capital was kept inside businesses and served as a cheap form of long-term 
debt. Starting with July 2007, workers can choose if they want any future flows to be invested 
in pension funds instead of being kept in the firm. To the extent that this option is indeed 
chosen, firms' liquidity decreases and their external financing capacity deteriorates. Taking 
into  account  the  severity  of  financing  constraints  of  Italian  SMEs,  the  authors  provide 
simulations that predict a fall in the investment level of 130-147%  of the total outflow  to 
pension funds in the long run. 
A  few  studies  have  analyzed  the  interaction  between  more  general  levels  of 
employment protection and financing constraints. Employment protection increases a firm's 
adjustment costs when it has to rescale its operations, but also includes firing costs that raise 
a company's labor cost more directly. Analyzing data for ten European countries over 1994-
2000, Calcagnini, Giombini, and Saltari (2009) argue that firms which are hit by a negative 
shock,  experience  tighter  financing  constraints  in  countries  with  strong  employment 
protection. Investment is generally lower when both labor and capital markets are very rigid. 
Cingano, Leonardi, Messina, and Pica (2010) analyze firms' investment behavior in more 
detail,  using  data  from  14  European  countries  over  the  period  1997-2003.  Strong 
employment protection reduces the capital-labor ratio in general. The effect is, however, of 
lower  magnitude  in  firms  that  have  higher  internal  assets  and  are  thus  less  likely  to  be financially constrained. Similarly, also the value added per worker is more heavily reduced by 
labor market rigidities when financing frictions are present. 
Firms that face financing problems thus seem to be more seriously affected by a 
broad range of public policy instruments that raise labor costs and reduce firms' flexibility in 
firing decisions. Lower investment is accompanied by higher unemployment. The empirical 
studies  suggest  that  in  countries  where  both  markets  are  characterized  by  substantial 
rigidities, complementary reforms in both markets would have more beneficial implications 
than policy efforts targeted at one market only. 
 
10.  CONCLUSION 
Investment  in  small  innovative  firms,  typically  the  most  dynamic  sector  in  an 
economy, is often fraught with financing problems. The effects of public policy instruments 
targeted at these firms then depend on how these measures interfere with the financing 
constraints. As constrained companies invest at an inefficiently low scale, corporate taxation 
is particularly harmful to them. Even 'neutral' tax systems which do not affect the user cost of 
capital,  still  reduces  cash-flow  and,  thereby,  investment  of  constrained  firms.  Further, 
entrepreneurs  become  more  reluctant  to  undertake  R&D,  leading  to  less  innovation  and 
lower average productivity levels in the economy, when taxes erode cash-flow and thereby 
tighten up finance constraints and restrict investment of innovative firms. In contrast, R&D 
subsidies  or  more  generous  deductions  in  the  tax  code  strengthen  the  firm's  internal 
resources and relax financing constraints, thereby allowing firms to exploit the investment 
opportunities created by innovation to a larger extent. In this survey, we have emphasized 
the new transmission channels as well as the welfare implications of tax and subsidy policy 
in a wide range of policy areas when part of firms are finance constrained and investment 
becomes sensitive to cash-flow. We have also emphasized the ways how institutional and 
legal reform and financial development can improve aggregate economic performance.   REFERENCES 
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